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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 21-2741
___________
JEROME JUNIOR WASHINGTON,
Appellant
v.

MICHAEL WENEROWICZ, Superintendent of SCI Graterford; CHRISTOPHER
MECHANICSBURG, Director Overall of SCI-Graterford; JOE KORSZNIAK,
Correctional Administrator; DOCTOR WEIER, Director; CHRISTAIN Second in Charge
of Sick Call Doctors; NURSE DENNIS; DOCTOR J. DEFRANGESCO;
JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS SUED IN THEIR OFFICIAL
CAPACITIES & INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:15-cv-04102)
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
December 29, 2021
Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ and BIBAS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed January 5, 2022)

_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
In 2015, Appellant Jerome Washington, a prisoner proceeding pro se, initiated this
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his first amended complaint, he alleged that the
defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs while he was imprisoned at
SCI-Graterford.1 He named as defendants several employees of SCI-Graterford: the
superintendent and a correctional administrator (the “Non-Medical Defendants”); two
doctors (the “Medical Defendants”); and three other employees and John Does (the
“Unserved Defendants”).
In May 2021, the District Court granted a motion to dismiss filed by the NonMedical Defendants, holding that the first amended complaint failed to comply with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)’s requirement that it contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and that it was
unclear from the first amended complaint how the Non-Medical Defendants were
involved in the alleged deliberate indifference to Washington’s medical care.2 The

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1
Washington is presently imprisoned at a different facility.
2

In their motion, the Non-Medical Defendants argued in the alternative that the claims
against them should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack
of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity and under 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim.
2

District Court gave Washington the option of filing a second amended complaint by a
date certain or standing on his first amended complaint. Washington did not timely file a
second amended complaint. On August 19, 2021, the Medical Defendants filed a motion
to dismiss.
On September 3, 2021, the District Court held a telephonic status conference. At
the conference, the District Court stated that both motions to dismiss had been granted,
though the docket does not indicate that the Medical Defendants’ motion to dismiss had
been granted at that time. The Court further stated that it would give Washington 60 days
to file a second amended complaint and that if Washington needed more time he could
get in touch with the Court. Washington expressed frustration over the unsuccessful
attempts to serve the Unserved Defendants.3 He opined that the case had been going on
for far too long and requested that the District Court dismiss the case because he “would
rather go to the Third Circuit.” (Tr. at 13). He added that there was “no way” he was
going to file anything because filing a second amended complaint would give the
defendants another chance and agreeing to start “all over” would let the defendants file
answers they should have already filed. (Id. at 13-14). After a short colloquy, the
District Court clarified: “just to make sure that—that we understand it, you want to stand
on your amended complaint and you have chosen to stand on your amended complaint
and will decline, as is your right to do that, to file a second amended complaint. Did I say
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Both the Non-Medical and the Medical Defendants had waived service. It appears that
the delay in serving the unserved defendants was caused by Washington’s failure to
complete Form USM-285s for these defendants.
3

that correctly?” (Id. at 14). Washington affirmed that the Court’s understanding was
correct.
The Court subsequently issued an order dismissing the Unserved Defendants
without prejudice for lack of service,4 granting the Medical Defendants’ motion to
dismiss as uncontested pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1(c), and stating:
“[g]iven that Plaintiff has agreed to dismiss all claims against all served Defendants, to
stand on his Amended Complaint, and to the entry of final judgment in favor of the
served Defendants, all claims are DISMISSED against [the Medical and the NonMedical Defendants].” (ECF 113). Judgment was entered accordingly. Washington
timely appealed and has filed a document in support of his appeal.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s
dismissal of a complaint for failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 8 for an
abuse of discretion. In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 702 (3d Cir. 1996).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Each averment
must be “simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). “Taken together,” Rules
8(a) and 8(d)(1) “underscore the emphasis placed on clarity and brevity by the federal
pleading rules.” Westinghouse, 90 F.3d at 702 (quotation marks omitted). A complaint

4

Because the Unserved Defendants were never served with process, they were never
parties to the case within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). See
Gomez v. Gov’t of V.I., 882 F.2d 733, 735-36 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Studivant,
529 F.2d 673, 674 n.2 (3d Cir. 1976). Accordingly, the District Court’s order is final and
appealable, and we have jurisdiction over this appeal. See Gomez, 882 F.2d at 735-36.
4

must “‘be presented with clarity sufficient to avoid requiring a district court or opposing
party to forever sift through its pages in search’ of the nature of the plaintiff’s claim[.]”
Glover v. FDIC, 698 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d
1434, 1436 (7th Cir. 1990)).
We construe pro se filings liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (per curiam), and “are more forgiving of pro se litigants for filing relatively
unorganized or somewhat lengthy complaints.” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69,
92 (3d Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). We may summarily affirm if the appeal fails to
present a substantial question. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011)
(per curiam); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
The 71 pages that make up the first amended complaint are densely packed with
single spaced handwritten sentences which, though grouped into various sections and
numbered paragraphs, are difficult to follow and interpret. See Garrett, 938 F.3d at 93
(explaining that “a district court acts within its discretion when it dismisses an
excessively prolix and overlong complaint, particularly where a plaintiff declines an
express invitation to better tailor her pleading”). In light of these issues with the first
amended complaint, as well as the District Court’s case management plan centered
around giving Washington 60 days, or longer, to file a second amended complaint, we
conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the claims
against the Non-Medical Defendants for failure to comply with Rule 8. See id. at 92
(stating that “the question before us is not whether we might have chosen a more lenient
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course than dismissal . . . but rather whether the District Court abused its discretion in
ordering the dismissal”) (citation omitted).
We will also affirm the dismissal of Washington’s claims against the Medical
Defendants for the same reasons.5 We note that a District Court may dismiss a complaint
under Rule 8 as to non-moving defendants, provided that the plaintiff is given an
opportunity to file an amended complaint. See Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86-87
(2d Cir. 1995); see also Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir.
2002). As noted, Washington declined the opportunity to file a second amended
complaint and instead requested that the case be dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the judgment.

To the extent that the District Court may have granted the Medical Defendants’ motion
to dismiss as unopposed pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(c), based on Washington’s failure to
file a response, this would likely be improper. See Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951
F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991) (“[T]his action should not have been dismissed solely on the
basis of [a local rule requiring responses to motions to be filed within 14 days] without
any analysis of whether the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, as provided in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)”). However, we may affirm on any
ground apparent in the record. See Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 122 n.1 (3d Cir.
2001).
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